The days before ceasefire between SLORC AND NMSP on 25 June 1995
(Quoted from The Nation, Tuesday September 6, 1994)

Business interests that destroy brotherly relation between Thai and Mon
Thailand's demand for Burmese resources, and its sudden intolerance for
refugees, has soured its relationship with the Mon.

Mon officials are fond of saying that the Thai and Mon peoples are
phi-nongkan: brotherly. They reel off lists of famous Thais who purport to have Mon blood
in them, including both Anand Panyarachum and Suchinda Kraprayoon. They also
note that the same Burmese king who sacked Ayutthaya more than 200 years ago
also destroyed the Mon kingdom of Pegu.

More to the point, Mon separatists who have been fighting Burma's military
regimes have always been able to count on Thailand's tacit support to help
keep its supply lines open. So it is with great consternation that they see Thai
authorities slowly but surely turning their back on the Mon - and other ethnic
groups fighting the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) - in
favour of the Rangoon-based junta, which has for more abundant resources under its
control.

Thailand's National Security Council (NSC), considered the architects of
Thailand's Burma policy, has apparently decided that it is no longer necessary
to have a buffer between Thai and Burmese forces along the border. While Thais
in general do feel sympathy and kinship toward the Mon, they also seem fed up
with harbouring refugees crested by wars in neighbouring countries. Continuing
squabbles with Cambodia have added to this "compression fatigue".

Hence the recent crackdown by Thai authorities on illegal immigrants and
refugees from Burma who have found sanctuary in Thai border region for years,
in some cases decades. The controversy over Thai effort to repatriate 6,000
Mon refugees from a border checkpoint back to Halockhani is only the latest, and
most highly publicized, conflict emerging from this crackdown. The Mon were
just this year relocated from Loh Loe camp in Thailand to Halockhani in
Burma - only to flee back to Thailand in July 1994 following a raid on Halockhani by
Burmese soldiers based at Three Pagodas Pass.

Thailand, on the other hand, is chronically concerned about the security of
its energy supply, but the Burmese gas is especially tempting for economic
reasons. "Thailand doesn't need Burmese gas. There are enough low-cost energy
alternatives in the region," says Dr Charles Johnson, an energy analyst at the
East- West Center who stresses that he is neither arguing for or against the
pipeline project. "There's gas in Vietnam and Cambodia. Malaysia alone has
huge reserves - around 68 trillion cubic feet."

However, Malaysia also has more bargaining power than Burma. Negotiations to
import gas from Malaysia were proceeding slowly because Malaysia wants to
refine the resource at home and export only end-products to Thailand. It's far
more profitable for Thailand to import natural gas wholesale from Burma. Gas
is not the only resource coveted by Burma's neighbours. Thai investors have
used the concessions in Burma, and have contributed to the rapid depletion of
Burma's forest and marine resources.

Thai commanders of the Kanchanaburibased 9th Infantry Division have also
announced that thousands of Mon refugees at Pa Yaw camp in Thailand will be
repatriated once a budget has allocated, probably during the next dry season.
Publicly, both Mon and Thai officials find it convenient to divorce this issue
from politics. Thai officials say it is simply part of the policy to expel all
illegal immigrants, ignoring the fact that many refugees have fled to Thailand
because of human rights abuses in Burma.

Meanwhile, Nai Pe Theing Zea, the assistant in charge of foreign affairs for
the New Mon State Party (NMSP) the Mon separatist movement's political wing,
claims party leaders did not even discuss the refugee issues during their
recent intensive meeting. "We have to look after our people in border areas,
but we also have to respect Thai sovereignty," he says. "We want to try and
protect our people with armed force, but we can't protect Halockhani. It's too
close to Three Pagodas Pass," he admits. "So we would like the Thai government
to provide some protection to our people."

The Mon, he point out are eager to have good relations with the Thai
government. So he cannot state what many analysts clearly recognize: that
certain groups in Thailand are trying to force the Mon into signing a
ceasefire with the Slorc by pushing Mon refugees into a vulnerable position. But nor
does he deny that all the repatriation is having an impact. "After the Thais
decided to move the refugees to Halockhnai, we realized they would be
vulnerable to attack from the Slorc," Pe Theing Zea explains. " So we tried to
talk to the Slorc. But that does not mean we have to do whatever they say."
Negotiations for a ceasefire in the decades-old war have now stalled, with the
Mon claiming they were offered little territory and no political concessions.

So now the Mon are taking aim where Burma is most vulnerable: at a gas
pipeline which will be built through and area of southern Burma largely inhabited by
Mons and Karen. Unfortunately, the pipeline will transport gas from the Yedana
field in the Gulf of Martaban to Thailand with foreign exchange flowing in the
opposite direction. Once again the Mon separatists will come into conflict
with Thailand. Nevertheless, maintains Pe Theing Zea, "We must stand by our
principles "Foreign companies will encourage SLORC to stay in power and buy
more arms and equipment to kill and oppress the people. We can not allow that"
he asserts.

The NMSP's official position is that the gas belongs to the Mon people.
Rather than benefiting from the gas however ,Pe Thening Zea is afraid the pipeline
will be built in much the same way as the Ye-Tavy Railway ; with forced
labour. "This violates our human rights, so we will oppose the pipeline by any means,"
he says. "Using violence to destroy the pipeline would be our last option, but
in the end we would have no choice."

Nor is gas the only resource coveted by Burma's neighbours. Thai investors
have used the conflict between SLORC and opposition groups to buy up timber
concessions in Burma, and have contributed to the rapid depletion of Burma's
marine resources. "Many Mon fishermen have lost their jobs because they can
not compete with Thai trawlers that have fishing concessions along the coast,
along with those from Japan, Malaysia and Singapore," says the Mon official.

By opposing the pipeline, the Mon are playing a dangerous game, Squeezed
between Burmese soldiers and Thai business interests, however, they seem to
have little choice. But Thailand, too, is playing a dangerous game. Thai
officials apparently did not expect such a huge outcry to result from the
forced repatriation of the Mon refugees-- for that essentially is what they
are doing by depriving the refugees of rice until they return to Halockhani. In
fact, Border Police officials claim they were at one point given an order to
tear down the refugees' huts at New Halockhani, but managed to reject it -- a
wise decision considering the attention the issue has received.

Thai officials maintain that Col Tin Kyaw, commander of the Burmese 61st
Light Infantry Battalion currently based at Three Pagoda Pass, has promised not to
attack Halockhani if the refugees return. But he made no such guarantees to
three journalists who attempted an impromptu interview of him recently. "We
get our orders from Rangoon," he told the reporters. "If the Mon have guns, we
will have to arrest them. That's war. "Finally, fed up with the nosy questions, he
explained that, "Whatever the Thai soldiers say, that's the truth," and had
the journalists ushered out.

Even if this battalion does not bother Halockhani residents, another battalion
might. And if forced labour is used to build the pipeline, there may be a new
influx of refugees. Even more worrisome is the possible outbreak of heavy
fighting between Mon guerillas and the SLORC. With the breakdown in ceasefire
negotiations between the two groups, and the signing of the gas deal between
Thailand and Burma due this Friday in Rangoon, such a battle is becoming
increasingly likely.

Mons and SLORC: A major battle may be looming over pipeline

"If the SLORC and Thais agree on the natural gas deal and they start to build
the pipeline, then the Slorc may launch a big offensive against us," says a
worried Nai Pe Theing Zea. The Mon National Liberation Army (MNLA) has
officially been at war with Burma's military rulers for decades, but over the
last eight months NMSP and SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council)
officials have been attempting to negotiate a cease fire agreement. Those
talks have now stalled.

Fresh from a meeting of the central committee of the New Mon State Party
(NMSP) - the political wing of the Mon separatist movement - Pe Theing Zea
announced that the NMSP had decided to suspend talks with the Slorc because
the Junta's territorial concessions were too paltry, and its political concessions
nonexistent. The Central Committee meeting is still going on, add the NMSP's
assistant in charge of foreign affairs, but the decision to halt the ceasefire
negotiations was definite. Pe Theing Zea declared that, "We have decided
not to meet the SLORC again until they agree to discuss 14 point which we have raised
and which refer to a political settlement." One of these 14 points is
that:  The Slorc should release Aung San Suu Kyi, the detained Noble Peace Prize
winner and leader of the party which won an overwhelming victory in Burma's
1990 elections.  Another is that the Slorc should sign a nationwide ceasefire with the guerilla
groups.

This suggest that the Mon would only agree to re-start negotiation in
cooperation with the guerilla groups who have yet to sign a ceasefire. So far,
the military junta has negotiated individual ceasefire agreements with certain
groups - including the Kachin and the Wa - in exchange for allowing them to
administer their own territory. But the Mon apparently are not ready to team
up with other groups in joint negotiations, even thought it would bring them
more bargaining leverage. While the Mon may be upset at being denied any
political concessions by the SLORC - they would only be allowed to attend the
national constitutional convention if they agreed to lay down their
weapons, Pe Theing Zea said, and then only as observers - they say they are prepared to
re-start talks if SLORC offers more territory.

"We don't want to sign a ceasefire agreement without a full political
settlement, but we were willing to sign a general agreement on where troops
could go," Pe Theing Zea explained. "But each time we met, the SLORC kept
offering us a smaller and smaller area. "If they offered us a larger area, it
is possible we would accept it. But this would only be a first step; then we
would have to go into political issues," he added. Despite such distinctions,
it remains unclear how such a "general agreement" would differ from a de facto
ceasefire.

The Mon are without doubt unhappy with the territorial concessions offered by
the SLORC after three meetings earlier this year. The first meeting was
held in Moulmein from Dec 31, 1994. The Mon proposed taking control of five big areas:
Moulmein, Hta Ton, Mergui, Tavoy and the Central HQ district. The SLORC then
reportedly reduced the size of these areas but said it could agree to them. At
the second meeting in March, Lt Col Kao Rot claims SLORC no longer accepted
the previously proposed five areas, instead offering only three. The Mon then
proposed a list of 54 pinpoint zones which they would control. But the SLORC
said they could have only 12.

At the third meeting in June the Mon proposed taking control of 3-4 pinpoint
areas in each of four districts: Moulmein, Mergui, Hta Ton and Tavoy. But the
SLORC stood firmly by its previous offer of 12 pinpoints. In the end, they
were only offered 12 small zones -- each with a five-kilometer radius -- in
which their troops would be allowed to roam freely. Nine of these zones were
in their Central Headquarters District, located in the jungle across the
border from the Pa Yaw refugee camp in Kanchanaburi.

Pe Theing Zea says that at their last meeting with the SLORC, the Mon were
essentially told, "take it or leave it ". They have decided to leave it. The
MNLA is not the biggest armed opposition group, but its forces are
strategically placed. They apparently roam in patch of territory stretching
from Htaton in the north down to Mergui in south.

Lt Col Kao Rot, an MNLA officer who took part in the negotiations, notes that
a ceasefire with the Mon may have led to a good deal of foreign investment in
southern Burma, particularly from the Thai. "If there had been a
ceasefire, we know that the SLORC planned to build up the highway running from Three Pagoda
Pass to Thanbyuzayat and on to Kyaikkami (Amherst), which is a local center
for tourism. They planned to offer hotel concessions and so on to the Thais," he
said.

Even more important to both Thailand and the SLORC is the construction of a
700 kilometer long pipeline long pipeline that would transport natural gas
from Burma's Yadana field -- under concession to a consortium of Western oil
companies including Frances Total and Unocal of the US. From the Gulf of
Martaban, the pipeline is projected to come ashore to the south of the Heinze
Basin, head east to enter Thailand at Ban I-Tong, and end up at a power plant
in Ratchburi.

Pe Theing Zea notes that SLORC, desperate for legitimacy and hard currency,
has sold the gas cheap. The Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) has agreed
to buy it for around US$2.50 per BTU, well below the price of domestically
produced gas if transportation costs are included. For the Thais, it
represents just another source of energy, albeit a convenient and profitable
one. But for the SLORC, it would bring much-needed legitimacy and hard
currency. And Burmese opposition groups fear it could become the final nail in
the coffin for their hopes of winning democracy for Burma or autonomy from it.

The operational date for the pipeline has been set for mid-1998. That doesn't
leave much time to finance and build it. Both these aspects will be heavily
influenced by the security situation along the pipeline route, and area which
is heavily populated by both Mons and Karens. The Mon were certainly aware of
this, and Pe Thein Zea spoke out vociferously against the project, vowing to
oppose it "by all possible means". This explains his concern upon learning
that Thailand and Burma had finally agreed on a price for the gas.

The agreement will result in a signing ceremony this Friday in Rangoon, and
possibly to a major battle between the MNLA and the SLORC in southern Burma
once the rainy season has ended. Unless, that is, the two parties can agree to
some form of armed co-existence. As it stands, Lt Col Kao Rot claims Mon
troops are active north of the Heinze Basin, where the SLORC also has six battalions
in place. The area south of the Basin is controlled by the SLORC, he said.

There are reportedly three battalions of the Burmese troops in Kaleinaung - a
key town as it intersects both the pipeline route, the main Ye-Tavoy road and
the Ye-Tavoy railway, which analysts claim is being built to provide greater
security for the pipeline. SLORC officials have also vowed to clear a path for
the pipeline 60 meters wide and line it with soldiers. Further east, Mon
troops are active north of the Zinba River -- along which the pipeline is
expected to run - while Karen National Liberation Forces (KNLF) are active to
the south, according to Kao Rot. SLORC troops control the town of Nai
Et-Taung, on the Thai-Burma border across from Ban I-Tong.

The Karen National Union has so far declined to negotiate with the SLORC,
although it says it is open to dialogue. So even if the Mon do sign a
ceasefire, the pipeline may still be vulnerable. Kao Rot says there is also a
whole host of smaller guerilla groups reportedly active in the area, including
the All-Burma Students Democratic Front, the People 's Defence Force (ethnic
Burmese) and the Democratic Patriotic Army (former members of the Burmese
Communist Party who mostly come from Tavoy and Mergui).

Thai officials may look upon this situation with alarm. Some have argued
that they are not taking sides in Burma's political strife, but merely striking a
business deal. But of course simply choosing which group one strikes a deal
with is a political decision. This will hit home if a war does break out over
the pipeline and refugees once again start flooding into Thailand, where they
have recently received a cold welcome, or rather no welcome at all. Others
have argued all along that helping Burma to develop economically even if it
means helping the SLORC will eventually bring it greater political freedom.
This is the Asian way, they add.

But have they really considered what the costs of such a policy may be in
terms of  human lives?
Have they actually done all they can to help negotiate a fair and equitable
peace agreement between Burma's warring factions?
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